Redemption is by no means given for the two football men who over-estimated themselves most in 2012.
In the end, their Euros ended a lot quicker than expected. Giovanni Trapattoni’s Ireland were holed in the opening minutes by Croatia and never recovered.
Erik Hamren’s Sweden didn’t even last that long. The naming of Markus Rosenberg for their opener against Ukraine meant that the game was lost before it even began.
Whereas Ireland sank without a trace after the Croatia defeat, the Swedes struggled on manfully against England and even managed a hollow victory against France when it no longer mattered.
What both sides had in common, and what will come to a climax when the two sides meet in key World Cup qualifiers in 2013, is their managers; and more specifically, their massive over-confidence in their own ability.
Trapattoni arrived at the Euros convinced that it was he, not his players, who got Ireland there.
He remains convinced that it was his desperately negative tactics, rather than the skills of his XI, that ensured qualification.
Or the fact that the Irish got lucky, drawing a brave but limited Estonia side after barely surviving a perilous qualifying campaign.
It is worse for Sweden, because at least Trapattoni’s limits were shown up by subsequent results.
But when it comes to Erik Hamrén, the smoke and mirrors provided by the genius of Zlatan Ibrahimovic serves to disguise the tactical naivety of the national team coach.
Two incidents stood out this year that showed up his tactical shortcomings.
The first was the selection of Rosenberg – only in the squad due to an injury to John Guidetti and a domestic violence conviction for Alexander Gerndt – to start agaist Ukraine, and what it said about the coach’s mentality.
Despite taking the lead in that game, Sweden struggled, particularly inn the first half. The selection of Rosenberg skewed the balance of the team, forcing Toivonen onto the left wing where he was equally ineffective.
Hamrén later revealed at the post-game press conference that the tactical plan was to attack with long balls for the first 15 minutes, but that the Swedes then couldn’t break the pattern.
To think that raining a few high balls was going to disturb one of the host nations in their opening game in their capital city is breathtakingly naive.
The fact that Hamrén then couldn’t get his players to stop doing so is almost comically inept.
And as for Rosenberg? He played 71 minutes and was barely seen before being replaced by the injured Johan Elmander.
He played 11 more minutes against England, and was equally invisible. Anyone who has seen him play for West Bromwich Albion will know that he is a journeyman – talented, but limited.
And nowhere near good enough to start the opening game at a major tournament.
But for Erik Hamrén, he was the joker in the Euro pack, the man whose inclusion from the start would turn Sweden’s fortunes against the hosts.
What Oleh Blokhin thought of him has so far gone unrecorded, but I’d say if you were to ask him who Sweden’s number 22 was on that night, he wouldn’t remember. And Markus Rosenberg himself probably doesn’t want to.
Of course, the most telling comparison between Trapattoni and Hamrén can be gleaned from the respective qualifiers against Germany this autumn.
Ireland were disembowled 6-1 in front of their own fans, and yet somehow, despite massive internal and external opposition, Trapattoni survived.
His shameful blaming of the players, his claiming of credit where none was due, was one of the more bare-faced examples of his conviction that it is he, and not they, that is the ultimate architect of all success – and none of the failure.
Hamrén’s side fared much better against the Germans, fighting back miraculously from 4-0 down to snatch a point, but that result only tells part of the story – once again he appeared to pick the wrong team, and once again he very nearly left it too late to correct his mistake.
Samuel Holmén on the wing wasn’t much of an inspired choice, but it was the selection of Pontus Wernbloom in central midfield that betrayed Hamrén’s plan to contain, rather than attack, one of the best sides in the world.
It failed, dismally, and Sweden were torn apart. Wernbloom is an excellent player who has matured immensely (and a joy in press conferences and mixed zones), but if you invite a team like Germany to play football in front of you, they will – and then they’ll play through you, as Ireland had found out to their cost a few days previously.
For once it wasn’t the magisterial Ibrahimovic who turned the game, even if he did play a big part; it was the introduction of Kim Källström that turned the game on its head.
Several weeks later I cornered Erik Hamrén and asked him about the turnaround.
He had previously made much of the fact that eventually he got the balance right, and that the players that finish the game are almost more important than the ones that started it.
I pressed him on what Sweden managed to do that Ireland didn’t or couldn’t, and he became somewhat irritated.
“As I said before, it was attitude and commitment,” he told me, and I stopped listening.
Despite his stated penchant for watching games over and over again, he was unable or unwilling to offer a tactical explanation of what Sweden finally started to do right.
To Hamrén, the tactical details are seemingly unimportant, or at least not worth sharing with journalists and fans.
What is important is the triumph, the cigar, the collective effort. Not recognising the errors made when setting out the team, or trying not to repeat them.
It’s seldom profitable to extrapolate in this way, but ponder this fact: when Källström was on the pitch, Sweden beat Germany 4-1.
When Wernbloom was there, they lost 3-0.
Having seen virtually every game played under Hamrén, I doubt strongly that the tactical aspect of the game is his strong suit. He is an honset, decent, emotional man who is truly trying to do his best.
But his strength is in blending players together, motivating them, creating an atmosphere in which they can thrive and feel confident.
It’s not great, but it’s good enough to get results against some good teams.
It’s unlikely, however, to be good enough to fool Trapattoni, the grand master of footballing frustration.
Should the Italian – who celebrates his birthday on St Patrick’s Day, a week before the two teams clash in Stockholm – have Richard Dunne available, he will be confident of getting at least a point.
Trappatoni’s true gift is in gettign lesser minds like Hamren to reveal themselves and their weaknesses, and then punishing them accordingly.
Player for player, Sweden are superior to Ireland in most departments, and Trappatoni will use that knowledge to lure them out.
He will stop them playing balls up to Ibrahimovic (who has never played well against Ireland). They will kick and irritate him, and they will target the younger players for similar treatment.
THe Irish will target the Swedish full-backs, knowing them to be the weak links defensively, and that balls into the box are a lottery when Andreas Granqvist is in there defending.
And then, when they least expect it, Trapattoni will instruct his troops to exploit the tactical naivety of the Swedes at a corner or a set piece, and stage the Stockholm smash ‘n grab that England couldn’t manage.
Because ultimately, the difference in the two coaches is that one of them is more than aware of the limitations of his side and plays accordingly.
The other isn’t, and doesn’t.